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Introduction      
This analysis is the deliverable for the Airspace Systems Program, Systems Analysis Integration and Evaluation Project 
Milestone for the Systems and Portfolio Analysis (SPA) focus area SPA.4.06 Identification and Analysis of National 
Airspace System (NAS) Resource Constraints and Mitigation Strategies. 
“Identify choke points in the current and future NAS. Choke points refer to any areas in the en route, terminal, 
oceanic, airport, and surface operations that constrain actual demand in current and projected future operations. 
Use the Common Scenarios based on Transportation Systems Analysis Model (TSAM) projections of future demand 
developed under SPA.4.04 Tools, Methods and Scenarios Development. Analyze causes, including operational and 
physical constraints.” 
The NASA analysis is complementary to a NASA Research Announcement (NRA) “Development of Tools and Analysis 
to Evaluate Choke Points in the National Airspace System” Contract # NNA3AB95C awarded to Logistics Management 
Institute, Sept 2013.   
Motivation 
Identification of the major choke points in the NAS allows targeted research and development of concepts and 
technologies to increase capacity where most needed. This analysis by NASA focuses on understanding potential 
future capacity shortfalls based on projections of future demand for air transportation. The corresponding NRA is 
broader in scope and includes investigation of current day choke points, soliciting input from a comprehensive set of 
NAS stakeholders. 
Technical Approach 
The approach taken in this study is to use TSAM to predict unconstrained trip demand and NASA’s Airspace Concept 
Evaluation System (ACES) to investigate the impact on the future NAS. 
Transportation Systems Analysis Model 
TSAM is a nationwide transportation-planning model to forecast intercity travel behavior in the United States. TSAM 
is currently under development by NASA Langley Research Center and Virginia Polytechnic Institute’s Air 
Transportation Systems Laboratory. Figure 1 shows the components of the model. 
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TSAM predicts the number of trips of more than 100 miles between each of the 3076 counties in the contiguous 
United States. The model uses socio-economic and demographic data to make projections of future travel demand 
for trips by available modes; these are travel by air, road and rail, or any new mode modeled with performance and 
cost data, e.g. on-demand air service. TSAM projects international travel demand by air between the contiguous US 
and Alaska, Hawaii, and 10 world regions. TSAM also uses the FAA Aerospace Forecast projections of domestic and 
international cargo tonnage delivered to make a projection of cargo flights growth.  
Projections for air transportation depend primarily on cost, duration and convenience compared to competing 
modes. Advances in technology that improve these factors stimulate demand. Future projections of economic 
growth, population growth and geographic distribution of population are the underlying drivers.  
The model follows a four-step framework:  
• Trip Generation:  Prediction of the total number of trips  
• Trip Distribution:  Distribution of the trips generated amongst the origins and destinations 
• Mode Choice:  Prediction of the mode of travel individuals will choose for these trips 
• Network Analysis:  Prediction of the route the travelers will choose for their trip 
Ticket price is a major factor that influences demand for commercial air travel. TSAM bases ticket prices on historical 
data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database. For some routes, historical data is not available 
so for those TSAM uses a fare model. TSAM estimates future fares by scaling baseline year fares. The scalar depends 
on a number of factors, but a significant component of ticket price is fuel cost. This analysis uses the 2014 FAA 
Aerospace Forecast and as an alternative, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) projections from the EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook 2014. Figure 2 shows the different fuel price forecasts and Figure 3 the corresponding TSAM 
airfare scale factors. The EAI projects higher fuel costs than the FAA and that results in higher ticket prices in future 
years. 
 
 
Figure 2. Jet Fuel Price Forecast 
 
 
Figure 3. TSAM Future Airfare Scale Factor
TSAM allocates passengers to a mode and a route; the final step is to generate an airline schedule for ACES 
simulation.  The methodology is to scale up a baseline day of traffic recorded by the FAA’s Enhanced Traffic 
Management System (ETMS) using TSAM calculated growth factors for each route segment. TSAM utilizes an 
algorithm that both upgage aircraft, as well as increases flight frequency to accommodate route demand growth. A 
linear scaling of existing aircraft on the route can result in an unrealistically high frequency of flights on busy routes. 
In addition, there may be sufficient future demand to warrant introduction of commercial service between airports 
that currently do not have direct flights. The section Basis for the Introduction of Larger Aircraft and Direct Routes 
describes the process used to create these more realistic scenarios. 
In addition to the commercial airline and cargo traffic projections from TSAM, General Aviation (GA) traffic 
contributes to the future traffic load in the NAS. NASA uses a “GA Operations Model” to predict GA demand based on 
an original code created by LMI. Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) GA traffic is included in the analysis to add to the 
overall demand. Most of this GA traffic is between smaller airports and is not the focus of this study.  
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Basis for the Introduction of Larger Aircraft and Direct Routes 
Scaling up the baseline demand directly using TSAM growth factors leads to an unrealistic schedule for a few high 
traffic routes for the reasons explained in the section Transportation Systems Analysis Model. The schedule needs 
modifying, to consolidate passengers using multiple smaller aircraft into fewer larger aircraft and to introduce new 
direct routes when demand warrants. 
Small Jet Consolidation 
To model the airline trend of replacing uneconomical  30-50 passenger regional jets with larger 75-100 passenger 
jets, a small jet consolidation methodology is used. This methodology applies to CRJ1, CRJ2, DH8A, DH8C, E120, E135 
and E145 aircraft types. If the total number of passengers on a flight segment exceeds 100 per day then CRJ9 aircraft 
with a capacity of 76 passengers and CRJ10 aircraft with a capacity of 100 passengers replace the smaller regional 
jets. The selected aircraft mix has the minimum number of flights with seating capacity greater than or equal to the 
original flights. 
Schedule Frequency Growth Consolidation 
Airlines tend to increase flight frequency on a route as demand increases but only to the point at which increased 
frequency does not gain any market share. When a route has sufficient frequency, introducing larger aircraft with 
lower per seat costs is a better option. Airbus developed a frequency/capacity split model based on their historical 
analysis of airline route data originally published in “Airbus Global Market Forecast, 2005 to 2024”. 
The frequency/capacity split has a minimum and maximum frequency for a route and varies with distance:  
• If schedule frequency < minimum service frequency for segment distance then all growth accommodated by 
increased frequency 
• If schedule frequency > maximum service frequency for segment distance then all growth accommodated by 
increased aircraft capacity 
• If schedule frequency > minimum service frequency for segment distance and < maximum service frequency 
for segment distance then growth accommodated by combination of increased frequency and increased 
aircraft capacity  
Consolidation of the future flight schedules uses a methodology based on this Airbus frequency/capacity split model. 
Figure 4 shows the limit on the number of daily flights as a function of future flight frequency for a range of baseline 
numbers of flights. The maximum number of daily flights used is; 40 for segments less than 1,000 nmi and 20 for 
routes longer than this. If the projected future schedule frequency exceeds the calculated limit then larger aircraft 
replace multiple smaller aircraft. The methodology does not remove baseline flights and does not consolidate aircraft 
that have more than 300 passenger capacity. There is a maximum of four flights consolidated into one larger aircraft. 
The methodology selects an appropriate mix of larger aircraft types to accommodate the number of passengers while 
meeting the schedule frequency limit. 
 
Figure 4. Consolidation of Multiple Smaller Aircraft Flights to a Reduced Number of Larger Aircraft Flights 
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Introduction of Direct Routes 
As socio-economic and demographic factors change, demand increases for potential future service between some 
airports that do not currently have direct service. At some level of demand, it is likely that airlines will introduce a 
new direct route to service that demand. A direct-route introduction methodology models that effect. As the number 
of projected enplanements exceeds a threshold, the methodology introduces a minimum of two flights per day as 
morning-evening pairs. Increasing schedule coverage occurs as demand increases. The thresholds used currently are 
40,000 enplanements per year for segments 1,500 nmi or less and 50,000 enplanements per year for longer routes. If 
the baseline demand already exceeds the threshold and there is no direct service, the methodology does not add a 
direct route. This limitation is arbitrary (and can be changed), but the assumption is that other factors have 
prevented the airlines from providing direct route service. The aircraft types used initially are CRJ9 and B737 
respectively; these may be consolidated into larger aircraft as demand increases.  
Influence of Increased Travel Times on Passenger Choice of Route and Mode  
Travel time is a major factor that influences passenger choice of mode and route for a trip. Passengers may choose to 
travel by car, rather than aircraft for shorter trips if the time advantage of air travel is lost due to increased travel 
times. In some regions of the U.S. rail is a viable alternative. For longer trips where the only practical option is travel 
by aircraft, passengers may seek out alternative airline routes avoiding congested airports if the network allows.  
Increased travel times can be a direct result of systemic delays on a route effecting passengers, or indirectly the 
airlines can add time or “padding” to the flight-segment time to take into account routine delays. Both result in some 
loss of demand because the time increase reduces the utility of the trip. These changes in travel time can be input 
into TSAM and the effects on the travelers’ choices of mode or route to make the trip can be modeled. Note that the 
overall number of trips does not change. TSAM does not estimate the number of trips not taken due to increased 
travel times. 
Another major factor that influences passenger choice of mode is trip cost. It is likely that on congested routes, 
airlines would increase prices, to offset the cost of delays and to take advantage of the high demand; passengers are 
likely willing to pay more on popular routes. Raising ticket prices would increase the numbers of passengers 
switching modes or changing to an alternative air route. This effect on airfares is not included in the TSAM 
calculations, so there is a conservative estimate in the reduction of airline trips due to increased travel times. 
Table 1 summarizes the effects of increased travel time observed from TSAM analysis for the year 2030-projected 
demand. The effects of schedule padding are more significant than congestion overall. Although the losses are small, 
a combined loss of 0.74% of round-trip passengers annually is loss of potential revenue to airlines, in addition to the 
direct costs caused by delays. 
Table 1. Change in Round Trips due to Schedule Padding and Delays for 2030 Scenario 
Scenario Millions of Round Trips Annually 
Rail Airline Auto Total
1) Unimpeded Travel 
Times without Schedule 
Padding 
12.02 302.67 1232.68 1547.37 
2) Travel Times Based on 
OAG with Schedule 
Padding 
12.10 301.11 1234.16 1547.37 
3) Travel Times Based on 
OAG with Schedule 
Padding + Congestion 
Delays 
12.13 300.45 1234.79 1547.37 
Difference in Trips (2-1) 0.08 (0.67%) -1.56 (-0.52%) 1.48 (0.12%) 0
Difference in Trips (3-2) 0.03 (0.25%) -0.66 (-0.22%) 0.63 (0.05%) 0
Difference in Trips (3-1) 0.11 (0.92%) -2.22 (-0.74%) 2.11 (0.17%) 0
 
Effect of Schedule Padding 
TSAM uses airline schedule times from the Official Airlines Guide (OAG) for the air segment of the trip. However, the 
OAG times include padding to account for the expected routine delays on a route. Schedule padding is necessary to 
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maintain an on-time schedule. Passengers can then better plan their trips, avoid missed connections and airlines can 
report a greater percentage of on-time arrivals than would otherwise be the case. Airlines must balance these factors 
with the additional cost of schedule padding since crew cost increases and aircraft utilization decreases.  
In addition, this increased trip time causes some loss in demand, especially on the shorter routes. Comparing the 
OAG schedule times with the unimpeded air-route segment times from ACES simulation gives an estimate of the 
amount of padding on each segment. The unimpeded times are calculated using trajectories actually flown, as 
recorded in the ETMS baseline data, so may not be the minimum time for optimal routing. However, this serves as an 
approximation. Comparing the TSAM projections for trip times with and without padding then gives an indication of 
the effect on passenger choice.  
Table 1 shows a small reduction in annual airline round trips of 1.56 million, that is 0.52%. Of these, 1.48 million 
switch to auto and 0.08 million to rail. 
Table 2 shows the reduction in the number of airline passengers on the top 10 flight segments with most percentage 
reduction due to schedule padding. All of these segments originate or terminate at New York City area airports, and 
the schedule padding is significant on most. Note that the passenger numbers do not include passengers on the 
domestic leg of an international trip which can be significant for both KJFK1 and KEWR. Also note that two routes 
have less than 6 minutes of additional schedule time but still show significant reductions in passengers. The overall 
effect on passengers includes the effect of airport switching based on the relative times on other route choices and 
the network interactions are complex. 
Table 3 shows how longer trip times effect domestic enplanements at the airports with the most change. The table 
does not include international and domestic leg of international-trip enplanements. Overall, KEWR loses 5.8% of total 
enplanements due to congestion and KATL 4.8%, with the other airports losing lesser amounts. Some airports 
actually gain passengers; this is surprising, given increased trip-times, but is likely due to passenger route choices 
changing because of the increased trip-times on alternative routes.  
These results confirm that schedule padding can cause significant passenger losses on some routes compared to 
those achievable for predictable unimpeded times. Schedule padding can have a cost to the airlines due to additional 
to crew cost and loss of aircraft utilization, but padding is used to provide a reliable schedule for the airlines. 
(For conciseness standard 4 letter airport identifiers are used in tables and text; the full airport names and locations 
are available e.g. from http://www.airnav.com/airport/) 
 
Table 2. Reduction in Airline Passengers on Flight Segments due to Schedule Padding for 2030 Scenario 
Departure 
Airport 
Arrival 
Airport 
2030 Scenario based on  
ACES Unimpeded Trip Times 
2030 Scenario based on 
Current Day OAG Trip Times  
Difference Between 
Scenarios 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
(h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
(h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
Increase (h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Reduction 
KPHL KJFK 0.88 155 1.02 115 0.13 40 (26%) 
KBDL KJFK 0.97 141 1.35 113 0.38 29 (20%) 
KPVD KEWR 1.04 129 1.27 103 0.22 26 (20%) 
KJFK KRIC 1.39 59 1.65 47 0.26 12 (20%) 
KBWI KJFK 1.05 226 1.17 183 0.12 43 (19%) 
KEWR KBDL 0.82 225 0.98 186 0.16 40 (18%) 
KJFK KORF 1.28 160 1.40 133 0.12 27 (17%) 
KBDL KEWR 0.96 207 1.05 172 0.09 35 (17%) 
KEWR KTYS 1.83 94 2.15 79 0.32 16 (17%) 
KCLE KJFK 1.56 134 1.58 112 0.02 22 (17%) 
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Table 3. Change in Airline Passenger Domestic Enplanements at Airports due to Schedule Padding for 2030 Scenario 
Airport 
2030 Scenario based on  
ACES Unimpeded Trip 
Times Daily Passenger 
Enplanements 
2030 Scenario based on 
Current Day OAG Trip 
Times Daily Passenger 
Enplanements 
Difference 
Between 
Scenarios 
KEWR 34,633 32,628 -2,006 (-5.8%) 
KATL 169,126 161,011 -8,115 (-4.8%) 
KLGA 45,026 43,072 -1,955 (-4.3%) 
KJFK 24,812 23,959 -853 (-3.4%) 
KDTW 57,386 55,697 -1,689 (-2.9%) 
KPHL 40,063 39,168 -895 (-2.2%) 
KORD 119,465 117,022 -2,443 (-2.0%) 
KSFO 50,232 49,444 -788 (-1.6%) 
KMSP 65,516 64,594 -922 (-1.4%) 
KBOS 39,957 39,424 -533 (-1.3%) 
KDFW 105,185 107,479 2,294 (2.2%) 
KDEN 124,627 126,273 1,647 (1.3%) 
KBWI 29,655 29,938 283 (1.0%) 
KLAS 62,459 62,949 491 (0.8%) 
KSLC 51,821 52,054 233 (0.5%) 
KPHX 73,586 73,903 317 (0.4%) 
KSEA 50,411 50,592 181 (0.4%) 
KMCO 33,023 33,046 23 (0.1%) 
Effect of Congestion 
The average delay from ACES for all of the flights on a route for a single day gives an estimate of the increased trip 
times. Using these increased trips times in TSAM to create a new demand forecast for 2030 results in a further 
reduction in annual airline round trips, Table 1, of 0.66 million, that is 0.22% compared to the OAG based trip times.  
This number is surprisingly small but is likely because OAG schedule padding is excessive for a good weather day. 
Currently most flights arrive early in good weather. Of these airline trips lost, 0.63 million switch to auto and 0.03 
million to rail. 
Table 4 shows the reduction in the number of domestic airline passengers on the top 10 flight segments with most 
percentage reduction due to congestion. The flight segments with fewer than 100 passengers generally have only a 
couple of flights per day so any reductions will not significantly change overall delays at the origin or destination 
airports. KJFK is the destination for all but one of the routes with the largest reductions in passengers; the remaining 
route originates at KJFK. Two high-traffic routes, KBOS to KJK and KDCA to KJFK lose almost half their demand.  
Table 5 shows how longer trip times effect domestic enplanements at the airports with most change. The table does 
not include international and domestic legs of international-trip enplanements. Overall, KJFK loses 13.2% of total 
domestic enplanements due to congestion and KDCA 10.5%, with the other airports losing lesser amounts. Both KLGA 
and KEWR gain passengers, which is likely the result of passengers switching to other New York airports to avoid 
congestion at KJFK.  
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Table 4. Reduction in Domestic Airline Passengers on Flight Segments due to Congestion for 2030 Scenario 
Departure 
Airport 
Arrival 
Airport 
2030 Scenario based on 
Current Day OAG Trip Times  
2030 Scenario based on 
ACES Delayed Trip Times 
Difference Between 
Scenarios 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
(h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
(h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Mean 
Segment 
Flight Time 
Increase (h) 
Mean Daily 
Passengers 
Reduction 
KBDL KJFK 1.35 113 5.03 29 3.68 84 (74%) 
KELM KJFK 0.88 38 5.89 11 5.01 27 (71%) 
KGSO KJFK 1.88 42 7.09 17 5.21 25 (60%) 
KBWI KJFK 1.17 183 3.93 78 2.76 104 (57%) 
KMVY KJFK 1.05 42 4.59 21 3.54 21 (50%) 
KPHL KJFK 1.02 115 2.71 59 1.69 56 (49%) 
KJFK KBDL 1.07 99 1.01 52 -0.06 46 (47%) 
KACK KJFK 0.98 29 3.38 16 2.40 13 (46%) 
KBOS KJFK 1.12 1308 3.30 722 2.18 586 (45%) 
KDCA KJFK 1.08 698 3.53 388 2.45 310 (44%) 
 
Table 5. Change in Airline Passenger Domestic Enplanements at Airports due to Congestion for 2030 Scenario 
Airport 
2030 Scenario based on 
Current Day OAG Trip 
Times Daily Passenger 
Enplanements 
2030 Scenario based on 
ACES Delayed Trip 
Times Daily Passenger 
Enplanements 
Difference 
Between 
Scenarios 
KJFK 23,959 20,802 -3,157 (-13.2%) 
KDCA 37,532 33,596 -3,937 (-10.5%) 
KBWI 29,938 29,142 -795 (-2.7%) 
KDFW 107,479 105,739 -1,740 (-1.6%) 
KPHX 73,903 72,956 -947 (-1.3%) 
KLAS 62,949 62,266 -684 (-1.1%) 
KSLC 52,054 51,545 -509 (-1.0%) 
KDEN 126,273 125,485 -789 (-0.6%) 
KSEA 50,592 50,375 -217 (-0.4%) 
KMDW 42,169 41,990 -180 (-0.4%) 
KEWR 32,628 34,238 1,611 (4.9%) 
KLGA 43,072 44,755 1,684 (3.9%) 
KATL 161,011 166,899 5,888 (3.7%) 
KORD 117,022 120,859 3,837 (3.3%) 
KPHL 39,168 40,406 1,238 (3.2%) 
KDTW 55,697 57,342 1,645 (3.0%) 
KLAX 67,587 68,644 1,057 (1.6%) 
KCLT 64,270 64,978 708 (1.1%) 
KSFO 49,444 49,982 538 (1.1%) 
KMSP 64,594 65,035 440 (0.7%) 
Even though the overall system-wide reductions in airline trips are small, airports with severe congestion show 
significant reductions in trips and consequently delays on some routes as discussed in results section Effect of 
Passenger Choice on Congestion. 
Description of Data Sets Used for Analysis 
ACES simulation requires a Flight Data Set (FDS) containing a departure schedule and flight plan for all the IFR flights 
in the NAS for the scenario of interest. This analysis uses a baseline scenario, representative of current operations 
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and three scenarios for the year 2030. The baseline scenario, recorded on 25 July 2012 is representative of NAS 
operations on a high volume good weather day.  
The 2030 scenarios use TSAM demand projections with two different fuel price forecasts. The fuel price forecasts are 
the FAA’s estimated fuel price and the EIA forecast. The EIA forecasts higher fuel prices than the FAA and this reduces 
demand for air transportation. In addition, a variation of the 2030 scenario using FAA’s fuel price forecast uses ACES 
derived delays to influence the commercial airline schedule as described in Influence of Increased Travel Times on 
Passenger Choice . 
The Full FDS file contains 42 hours of traffic: 12 hours of “pre traffic” plus 24 hours of “Traffic of Interest” plus 6 
hours of “post traffic”. The Traffic of Interest consists of a day of traffic that is the basis for the analysis in this paper. 
The pre traffic ensures a fully populated NAS airspace to initialize all ACES NAS system models before the Traffic of 
Interest segment starts in the simulation. The post traffic maintains a fully populated NAS airspace to allow the 
Traffic of Interest to end with all ACES NAS system models fully loaded. This is particularly important to ensure 
correct functioning of the Traffic Flow Management (TFM) models in ACES. If the simulation is not fully loaded with 
traffic then TFM applies less delay to flights, so any analysis of delays will under-predict the effects of congestion. 
Table 6 lists a summary of the FDS scenario data and shows the number of flights in each category for the 24 hours of 
interest. The total traffic growth from TSAM projections is 37% over 2012 levels by the year 2030 using the FAA’s fuel 
price data.  
The difference between the 2030 FAA forecast and the 2030 EIA fuel price forecast only applies to domestic 
passenger airfares. The EIA higher fuel price results in 5.6% less growth in domestic passenger flights. The 
corresponding total growth is 34% over 2012 levels including all traffic. 
When frequent delays add to perceived trip-times, some passengers choose to travel by auto or select an alternative 
less delayed flight route. This only effects Domestic Passenger flights and results in 0.6% fewer flights overall. (Note 
that domestic legs of international trip passengers are included in the flight data sets but are not affected by the 
delay methodology used for this analysis.) 
Table 6. Characteristics of Flight Data Sets used For Analysis 
Scenario Domestic 
Cargo 
International
Cargo 
General 
Aviation 
Domestic
Passenger 
International
Passenger Total 
2012 Baseline 1296 324 19059 20599 3859 45132
2030 FAA Forecast 1683 753 23276 28013 7998 61723
Increase Over Baseline (%) 29.9% 132.4% 22.1% 36.0% 107.3% 36.8%
2030 FAA Forecast with 
Delay Influence on 
Passenger Choice 
1683 753 23276 27884 7998 61594 
Increase Over Baseline (%) 29.9% 132.4% 22.1% 35.4% 107.3% 36.5%
2030 EIA Forecast 1683 753 23276 26865 7998 60575
Increase Over Baseline (%) 29.9% 132.4% 22.1% 30.4% 107.3% 34.2%
 
Airspace Simulation 
This study uses NASA’s ACES Version 8.5. ACES is a fast time, distributed, agent-based simulation of the National 
Airspace System (NAS). ACES has models of airports, airspace, aircraft performance, basic Traffic Flow Management 
(TFM) and other elements of the NAS. The primary input is a flight schedule simulating a day of NAS operations. 
Outputs can include measures of airspace loading, airport loading, and numbers of conflicts requiring avoidance 
maneuvers, delays, throughput, fuel-burn and distance flown amongst other metrics. For this analysis, the primary 
metric of interest is delay, allocated to the various sources determined by simulation. ACES determines delay at 
various stages of flight by comparing the trajectory flown in simulation with a computed unimpeded trajectory. Total 
delay for each flight is the difference between actual gate arrival time in the simulation and the calculated 
unimpeded gate arrival time. 
ACES models the airport and airspace capacity constraints of the NAS. There are several choices of airport model 
available with different levels of fidelity. The basic airport model used for this analysis represents each airport as a 
node in the network with constraints on departure, arrival and total operations per hour. Airspace sectors are 3-
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dimensional regions in space with an associated maximum number of aircraft that can occupy the region 
simultaneously.  
The basic TFM in ACES predicts demand for resources and attempts to reduce traffic flow to ensure airports and 
airspace sectors are not overloaded. This results in delay to individual flights, either on the ground or in the air. The 
basic TFM model favors ground delays and then performs delay maneuvers in-flight, if needed. It does not perform 
rerouting around congested airspace. 
Basis for Current Day and Future Airport Capacity Estimates 
The ACES basic airport model requires a data file that specifies the maximum departure operations, maximum arrival 
operations and maximum combined operations for various weather conditions. The airport capacity file supplied with 
ACES “Top250AirportCapacity” contains data for the largest 250 airports, plus default values for the smaller airports.  
This file represents the estimated current airport capacities, last updated in 2010.   
The FAA has a “Future Airport Capacity Task” (FACT) team that analyses future capacity needs to determine which 
airports are likely to be constrained in the future, based on best estimates of future capacity. NASA obtained some 
pre-release FACT3 data from the FAA to insure the latest available projections of capacity were used in the current 
constraints analysis. FACT3 has capacity data for 69 airports for year 2011 (baseline), and improvements for 2020 and 
2030 with various assumptions. Runway improvements at KFLL, KORD and KPHL are included for 2020 with additional 
improvements for KPHL in 2030. Different levels of Air Traffic Control (ATC) improvements are also included, based 
on current NextGen planning and additional proposed improvements. In FACT3, these levels are “Near Term” 
NextGen, “Mid-Term” NextGen and “Advanced ATC”.   
Of the 69 FACT3 airports, 63 are currently in the ACES TOP250AirportCapacity file and 6 are additional (KDVT, KGYY, 
KHND, KHNL, KIWA, KTMB). NASA merged the FAA 69 airports data with the existing ACES 250 airport data to create 
the files: 
• 2011_Base_NASA_FACT3_256_AirportCapacity 
• 2030_AdvATC_NASA_FACT3_256_AirportCapacity  
The 2030 file with “Advanced ATC” assumptions represents Operational Improvements that are part of FAA’s 
NextGen plans and concepts. There are additional improvements that NASA and other researchers are investigating 
that are not included.  
This analysis uses NASA’s post-processing of the FAA’s 2030 data. Note that the ACES data files only include 3 
capacity data points whereas the FAA data has multiple points representing a capacity Pareto boundary. The capacity 
values used for ACES are a simplification of the FAA supplied data and are not exactly the FAA supplied values. 
 
Notes: The latest FACT 3 report is now available, published January 2015, reference 1. The final airport capacity values 
differ slightly from the pre-release data but are broadly similar. The “Advanced ATC” airport capacity values are not 
included in the published FACT3 report, since the report only contains projections for the year 2020. 
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Table 7 lists the assumed capacities and the differences compared to 2011 baseline values for the top 35 of the 256 
airports modeled by ACES. Note that some airports show a small decrease in capacity from 2011 to 2030. This is due 
to a change in the traffic weight category mix assumed by the FAA for the FACT3 analysis. The most significant 
increases are due to additional or improved runways. 
Table 7. VMC Airport Capacities used by ACES Simulation 
OEP 35 Airports 
 2011 2030 AdvATC Dep 
Diff 
Arr 
Diff 
Tot 
Diff 
Dep 
%Diff 
Arr 
%Diff 
Tot 
%Diff Dep Arr Tot Dep Arr Tot 
KATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta  140 120 221 167 130 255 27 10 34 19% 8% 15% 
KBOS Boston Logan  77 67 128 82 73 133 5 6 5 6% 9% 4% 
KBWI Baltimore/Washington  54 46 67 61 52 69 7 6 2 13% 13% 3% 
KCLE Cleveland Hopkins  97 83 132 99 91 134 2 8 2 2% 10% 2% 
KCLT Charlotte Douglas  102 130 181 119 139 194 17 9 13 17% 7% 7% 
KCVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky  126 129 183 131 142 190 5 13 7 4% 10% 4% 
KDCA Reagan Washington National  55 51 70 55 52 67 0 1 -3 0% 2% -4% 
KDEN Denver  209 179 297 236 193 331 27 14 34 13% 8% 11% 
KDFW Dallas/Fort Worth  107 172 262 112 193 287 5 21 25 5% 12% 10% 
 KDTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne  96 133 189 109 145 206 13 12 17 14% 9% 9% 
KEWR Newark Liberty  71 49 111 67 64 110 -4 15 -1 -6% 31% -1% 
KFLL Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood  66 55 81 75 87 124 9 32 43 14% 58% 53% 
KHNL Honolulu  113 74 122 126 69 126 13 -5 4 12% -7% 3% 
KIAD Washington Dulles  106 121 129 113 119 187 7 -2 58 7% -2% 45% 
KIAH George Bush Houston  103 94 197 117 101 217 14 7 20 14% 7% 10% 
KJFK New York John F. Kennedy  61 77 94 71 87 107 10 10 13 16% 13% 14% 
KLAS Las Vegas McCarran  59 82 122 58 92 132 -1 10 10 -2% 12% 8% 
KLAX Los Angeles  95 86 165 112 93 181 17 7 16 18% 8% 10% 
KLGA New York LaGuardia  47 44 83 54 49 90 7 5 7 15% 11% 8% 
KMCO Orlando  101 85 172 109 129 189 8 44 17 8% 52% 10% 
KMDW Chicago Midway  95 40 97 99 41 100 4 1 3 4% 3% 3% 
KMEM Memphis  101 107 149 118 132 154 17 25 5 17% 23% 3% 
KMIA Miami  92 77 155 110 118 174 18 41 19 20% 53% 12% 
KMSP Minneapolis/St. Paul  117 123 168 120 134 172 3 11 4 3% 9% 2% 
KORD Chicago O`Hare  116 125 235 217 191 329 101 66 94 87% 53% 40% 
KPDX Portland  66 78 124 66 86 125 0 8 1 0% 10% 1% 
KPHL Philadelphia  105 60 137 130 90 208 25 30 71 24% 50% 52% 
KPHX Phoenix Sky Harbor  68 83 150 85 92 163 17 9 13 25% 11% 9% 
KPIT Pittsburgh  109 83 162 110 83 163 1 0 1 1% 0% 1% 
KSAN San Diego  44 42 57 51 46 60 7 4 3 16% 10% 5% 
KSEA Seattle/Tacoma  68 60 116 72 65 121 4 5 5 6% 8% 4% 
KSFO San Francisco  101 71 111 101 74 105 0 3 -6 0% 4% -5% 
KSLC Salt Lake City  124 98 158 123 102 160 -1 4 2 -1% 4% 1% 
KSTL Lambert Saint Louis  107 80 131 104 82 128 -3 2 -3 -3% 3% -2% 
KTPA Tampa  72 75 116 72 77 117 0 2 1 0% 3% 1% 
Basis for Current Day and Future Sector Capacity Estimates 
The ACES airspace sector model requires latitude, longitude and altitude boundary data, plus a capacity value for all 
included sectors. The current day baseline data is from FAA data for year 2012 sectors.  
It is likely that increased automation along with advanced ATC tools will improve airspace capacity by 2030. It is 
possible that the existing sector based architecture will no longer be required. For this study, the future sector 
capacities are not a primary focus. The simulation used a 20% and 50% NAS-wide increase in sector capacities and 
unconstrained sector capacities (i.e. no limits on number of aircraft occupying a sector) to enable an analysis of delay 
sensitivity to airspace capacity.  
  
 11 
 
Results and Discussion 
Results from simulation using ACES indicate where major delays arise due to an excess of demand over capacity at 
constrained resources.  
Analysis of ACES delay data can quantify the delay at the point taken and quantify the delay according to the source. 
For example, for 100 hours of total departure delay taken at the gates of airport “X”: the source of delay is 50 hours 
due to insufficient departure capacity at “X”; 25 hours due to insufficient arrival capacity at airport “Y”; and the 
remaining 25 hours due to airspace congestion at various identified sectors. 
The analysis of sectors congestion is particularly complex since there are many interactions with other sectors and 
with airports that can influence the load on a specific sector. The aggregate amount of system-wide sector delay is a 
good indication of airspace congestion and the number and geographic locations of overloaded sectors can give 
insight into the worst airspace choke points. 
Table 8 shows the potential causes of delay identified by ACES: 
• Delays from Causes 1 and 2 are allocated to the subject airport “X” 
• Delays from Cause 3 are allocated to “X” as source but taken at “Y” 
• Delays from Causes 4 and 5 are allocated to “X” as source but taken in-flight 
• Delays from Cause 6 are taken at “X” but allocated to sector congestion 
• Delays from Causes 7 and 8 are allocated to sector congestion and taken in-flight 
 Table 8. Causes of Delay Identified by ACES Simulation 
Cause # ACES Identifier Explanation 
1 ATC_AAR Landing delay to meet Airport Arrival Rate (insufficient arrival capacity at “X”) 
2 ATC_ADR Takeoff delay to meet Airport Departure Rate (insufficient departure capacity at “X”) 
3 TFM_AAR_GATE Gate departure delay (at “Y”) due to capacity restrictions at destination airport (insufficient arrival capacity at “X”) 
4 TFM_AAR_MAN Maneuvering delay (in-flight) due to capacity restrictions at airport (insufficient arrival capacity at “X”) 
5 TFM_AAR_INT International crossing delay (in-flight) due to capacity restrictions at airport (insufficient arrival capacity at “X”) 
6 SECTOR_CONGESTION_GATE Gate departure delay (at “X”) due to congestion in sector 
7 SECTOR_CONGESTION_MAN Maneuvering delay (in-flight) due to congestion in sector 
8 SECTOR_CONGESTION_INT International crossing delay (in-flight) due to congestion in sector 
Summary of Results 
Table 9 shows a summary of the results obtained from ACES simulation.  Detailed analysis follows in later sections. 
Note that the total “Flights in 24 h” in the table is slightly less than in the “Total” in Table 6. This is because ACES 
rejects a small number of flights due to non-flyable trajectories or unknown aircraft types etc. 
For the Year 2012 scenario (run 1) with current day airports and airspace capacities, delays are generally low system-
wide on aggregate as expected since all simulation runs assumed perfect weather. Some airports are starting to 
become congested. Delay due to airspace congestion is negligible. 
The Year 2030 scenarios using FAA’s fuel price forecast (runs 2 to 6) have 37% more flights in total than the 2012 
scenario. The EIA forecasts somewhat higher jet fuel prices, leading to increased ticket cost and slightly less demand; 
run 7 has 34% more flights than the 2012 scenario. Note however that the total of all flights includes GA and cargo. 
The percentage increase in scheduled airline domestic plus international flights is 47% for the FAA’s fuel price 
scenario and 43% for the EIA fuel price scenario, see Table 6. The increase in scheduled airline flights is more relevant 
than the increase in total flights for the major airports.  
Run 2 is using 2030 demand, but assuming no improvements in airports or airspace capacity. This is an unlikely worse 
case, but is useful for comparison. Aggregate delays are still not large, at 349 seconds per flight on average. However, 
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run 2 has 9 times the total delay of the 2012 scenario and that is for Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 
capacities. In poor weather, there could be very long delays. Aggregate delays only give a broad overview of the state 
of the system; detailed analysis later in the report shows severe congestion at some airports and regions of airspace. 
 Runs 3 to 6 assume 2030 improvements to airports infrastructure and use of advanced ATC as described in Basis for 
Current Day and Future Airport Capacity Estimates. It is likely that increased automation along with advanced ATC 
tools will improve airspace capacity by 2030. It is possible that the existing sector based architecture will no longer be 
required. This study does not investigate expected increases in airspace capacity due to advanced technology and 
concepts; instead, the analysis determines delay sensitivity to sector capacities. The results show that increasing 
sector capacity by 20% reduces sector delay to the point that the dominant source of delay is insufficient airports 
capacity. Increasing sector capacity by 50% over current capacities reduces sector delays to negligible values. 
Furthermore, detailed analysis discussed later shows that only a small proportion of sectors are overloaded. 
Run 7 using the EIA fuel price forecast shows a 12% reduction in total delay compared to run 3, for a 2% reduction in 
the number of flights. This indicates that a small reduction in flights can have a disproportionate effect on reducing 
delays. Once a resource starts to become overloaded, delays tend to increase very rapidly. This result is an indication 
that changes to the routing or scheduling of flights to avoid congested resources or peak times can be very beneficial 
to the NAS. 
Run 8 with the influence of delays on passenger choice shows a 20% reduction in delays compared to run 6, for a 
0.2% reduction in the total number of flights; that is due to a 0.6% reduction in airline domestic passenger flights. The 
disproportionate reduction in delay indicates that delays are highly sensitive to passenger choice. The delay 
reduction has two causes; passengers switching to an alternative mode; and switching to less congested flight routes. 
The aggregate change in flights does not give insight into the reasons for the reduction in delays. Detailed analysis 
later in this report shows that passengers avoiding the most congested routes have a disproportionate effect on 
delays. 
Table 9. Summary of Delay Results 
 
Baseline Scenario for Year 2012 
The baseline scenario, recorded on 25 July 2012 is representative of NAS operations on a high volume good weather 
day. The report section Description of Data Sets Used for Analysis describes the process for creation of the scenarios. 
The  Basis for Current Day and Future Airport Capacity Estimates and Basis for Current Day and Future Sector 
Capacity Estimates list the corresponding capacity estimates. 
Run Scenario/ Year Airports 
Capacity 
Airspace Capacity Flights 
in 24 h
Airports 
Delay (h)
Sectors 
Delay (h) 
Total 
Delay (h)
Mean 
Delay per 
1 2012 (7/25/2012) Current Current Sectors 44598 623 33 656 53 
2 2030 Current Current Sectors 61039 4190 1739 5929 349 
3 2030 2030 With Advanced ATC Current Sectors 61039 2049 1608 3657 216 
4 2030 2030 With Advanced ATC 
Current Sectors
+ 20% 61039 2154 266 2420 143 
5 2030 2030 With Advanced ATC 
Current Sectors
+ 50% 61039 2166 14 2180 129 
6 2030 2030 With Advanced ATC Unconstrained 61039 2167 0 2167 127 
7 2030 EIA Fuel Price Forecast 
2030 With 
Advanced ATC Current Sectors 59892 1716 1506 3222 193 
8 
2030 Passengers 
Influenced by 
Delays 
2030 With 
Advanced ATC Unconstrained 60908 1744 0 1744 103 
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Airports Congestion 
The results discussed below are for run 1, Table 9. 
Figure 5 shows that delays remain low throughout the 24 hours of simulated operations. The average total delay for 
the 2012 scenario is less than one minute per flight and there are no flights with more than 1 hour of delay. This 
indicates that for a simulated perfect weather scenario using current day airports and sector capacities, sufficient 
capacity exists to meet demand, on aggregate. 
 
Figure 5. System-Wide Mean Hourly Delay per Flight for 2012 Scenario 
Table 10 shows that delays at the 10 airports with most delay are low for this perfect weather scenario. The table 
shows the delay at the point taken, not allocated to the root cause.  
Table 10. Airport Delay for 2012 Scenario 
Airport Total Delay 
(h) 
Total 
Operations 
Mean Delay per 
Operation (s) 
KATL 59.2 2495 85 
KLGA 49.1 1065 166 
KPHX 36.2 1196 108 
KCLT 34.5 1351 91 
KJFK 33.4 1071 112 
KDCA 26.4 773 123 
KORD 23.8 2150 39 
KEWR 19.6 1082 65 
KMSP 19.1 1256 54 
KLAX 18.3 1580 41 
The airports with most delay are KATL and KLGA; delays are still low, since hourly demand is within Visual 
Metrological Conditions capacity as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The figures show unconstrained demand, along 
with the actual departure plus arrival operations per hour. The actual operations are those that were achieved after 
any delays imposed by traffic flow management actions to meet capacity shortfalls. In both cases, the actual 
achieved operations are close to the unconstrained demand as expected, since there is sufficient good weather 
capacity at all times. The peak demand at KLGA almost reaches capacity for short periods, but there is still sufficient 
spare capacity between peaks to maintain low delays in VMC. In IMC when KLGA capacity reduces to 67 operations 
per hour, long delays are likely to occur since demand will then be above or near IMC capacity for extended periods. 
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Figure 6. KATL Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2012 Scenario 
 
Figure 7. KLGA Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2012 Scenario 
Table 11 shows delays allocated by cause as explained previously and defined in  Table 8. Inadequate arrival or 
departure capacity at the subject airport causes most of the delay. This delays both the subject airports own 
operations (ATC_AAR+ATC_ADR) and other airports operations (TFM_AAR_GATE) plus some in-flight delay 
(TFM_AAR_MAN+TFM_AAR_INT). The subject airport is the root cause of all of this delay. For example, KATL is the 
cause of 62.5 hours of total delay. Note that from Table 10, 59.2 hours of this delay is actually taken at KATL, the rest 
is taken on the ground at other airports or in flight, but a capacity shortfall at KATL is the root cause. In addition, 
there is some delay caused by sector congestion, taken on the ground at the subject airport, but not caused by the 
subject airport.   
For KORD, KEWR and KMSP the total delay caused by the airport is actually less than the delay taken at the airport. 
The additional gate delays are due to capacity restrictions at other airports.   
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Ranking by allocation of delay to root cause rather than by allocation by effect shows mainly the same airports 
causing most delay. However, the order is changed and KLAX drops from the top 10, replaced by KBWI. The two most 
delayed airports remain KATL followed by KLGA. Overall delays are low for this scenario. 
Table 11. Allocation of Airport Delay by Cause for 2012 Scenario 
Sectors Congestion 
The total sector delay listed in Table 9 for run 1, is only 33 hours system-wide; this represents 5% of the total delay. 
This is for perfect weather. Table 8 defines the causes of delay reported by ACES. To prevent sector overload, TFM 
delays traffic on the ground (GATE) or in-flight (MAN+INT). Table 12 shows that delays at the 10 sectors with most 
congestion are low. There is some indication that Denver sector ZDV07 is congested, but with a more sophisticated 
TFM model than the basic ACES model rerouting some flights around ZDV07 could reduce gate-holds. 
Table 12. Allocation of Sector Delay by Cause for 2012 Scenario 
Sector SECTOR_CONGST_GATE 
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_MAN
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_INT 
(h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
ZDV07 4.1 0.0 0.0 4.1 
ZBW20 2.7 0.5 0.3 3.5 
ZMP11 2.2 1.0 0.0 3.2 
ZID76 1.6 0.3 0.2 2.0 
ZLA39 1.2 0.8 0.0 2.0 
ZLC41 0.8 0.6 0.1 1.5 
ZMP17 1.2 0.3 0.0 1.5 
ZNY55 1.2 0.2 0.0 1.4 
ZMP20 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.3 
ZAU33 0.3 0.8 0.0 1.0 
 
Future Demand Scenario for Year 2030 
TSAM projects Year 2030 demand for air transportation as described in Transportation Systems Analysis Model. The 
FAA’s fuel price forecast and the EIA forecasts create two different levels of demand for analysis.  
For ACES simulation two airport capacity sets are used; a current day set for comparison and a set representing the 
estimated capacities for 2030 assuming infrastructure improvements and advanced Air Traffic Control technology as 
described in Basis for Current Day and Future Airport Capacity Estimates. 
The sector capacities used are current day plus 20% increase, 50% increase and unconstrained as described in Basis 
for Current Day and Future Sector Capacity Estimates. 
Airport 
ATC_AAR 
(h) 
ATC_ADR 
(h) 
TFM_AAR_
GATE (h) 
TFM_AAR_
MAN (h) 
TFM_AAR_
INT (h) 
Total 
Airport 
Source 
Delay (h) 
SECTOR_
CONGST_ 
GATE (h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
KATL 15.7 37.4 5.7 3.8 0.0 62.5 0.4 63.0 
KLGA 12.7 32.5 7.8 1.6 0.5 55.1 0.3 55.4 
KPHX 4.7 30.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 36.1 0.5 36.6 
KJFK 5.7 25.2 0.9 1.2 0.1 33.2 0.7 33.9 
KCLT 5.2 27.5 0.7 0.4 0.0 33.7 0.1 33.9 
KDCA 6.4 15.8 5.1 1.7 0.4 29.3 0.1 29.4 
KORD 5.1 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.8 0.6 22.4 
KBWI 4.4 11.6 4.5 0.7 0.1 21.3 0.2 21.5 
KEWR 6.2 10.7 0.9 1.2 0.1 19.2 0.3 19.4 
KMSP 3.0 13.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 16.3 2.7 18.9 
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The results below are for runs 2 to 8, Table 9. Run 7 is the only run using the EIA fuel price forecast scenario. Run 8 
takes into account the influence of delays on passenger choice. 
Airports Congestion 
With Current Airport and Airspace Sector Capacities 
Figure 8 shows aggregate delays for the 2030 demand scenario run 2, with current airport and airspace sector 
capacities. Using current capacities is not a realistic expectation of the available capacity in 2030; rather it allows 
analysis of the causes of delay, identifying shortfalls in capacity. Delays are substantially higher than for the baseline 
scenario, Figure 5 as expected since the number of flights has increased by 37% with no increase in capacity. 
 
Figure 8. System-Wide Mean Hourly Delay per Flight for 2030 Scenario with Current Airport and Sector Capacities  
Table 13 shows substantial delays at the 10 airports with most delay. The table shows the delay at the point taken, 
not allocated to the root cause. 
Table 13. Airport Delay for 2030 Scenario with Current Airport and Sector Capacities 
Airport Total Delay (h) 
Total 
Operations 
Mean Delay per 
Operation (s) 
KJFK 964.8 1768 1964 
KMIA 396.7 1976 722 
KATL 369.6 3422 388 
KBOS 211.8 1407 541 
KEWR 204.4 1682 437 
KLGA 179.1 1334 483 
KORD 176.7 2928 217 
KCLT 175.7 1938 326 
KDCA 165.2 1092 544 
KFLL 147.5 927 572 
 
 
Table 14 shows delays allocated by cause. The top choke point airport is KJFK followed by KATL, KLGA and KEWR. The 
analysis shows that a capacity shortfall at KJFK is responsible for 1506 hours of delay system-wide, although 
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operations at KJFK experience only 965 hours of this delay. The top 10 constrained airports account for 3564 hours of 
the 4190 hours of total delay listed in Table 9; that is 85% of the total delay due to airports. 
Table 14. Allocation of Airport Delay by Cause for 2030 Scenario with Current Airport and Sector Capacities 
With 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and Unconstrained Airspace Capacities 
Figure 9 shows aggregate delays for the 2030 demand scenario run 6, with 2030 Advanced ATC airport and 
unconstrained airspace capacities. In reality, airspace capacity is always limited; for the purposes of this section of 
the analysis, using unconstrained airspace allows analysis of airports constraints in isolation of airspace congestion 
effects. Delays are higher than for the baseline shown in Figure 5, indicating that even with all planned infrastructure 
improvements in place and assuming advanced ATC technologies, airport capacity is still not adequate to meet 
demand in 2030. 
 
 
Figure 9. System-Wide Mean Hourly Delay per Flight for 2030 Scenario with 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and Unconstrained 
Airspace Capacities. 
Table 15 lists the 10 airports with most delay. The table shows the delay at the point taken, not allocated to the root 
cause. 
Table 15. Airport Delays for 2030 Scenario with 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and Unconstrained Airspace Capacities 
Airport ATC_AAR 
(h) 
ATC_ADR 
(h) 
TFM_AAR_
GATE (h) 
TFM_AAR_
MAN (h) 
TFM_AAR_
INT (h) 
Total 
Airport 
Source 
Delay (h) 
SECTOR_
CONGST_ 
GATE (h) 
Total 
Delay 
(h) 
KJFK 256.1 429.6 687.1 88.3 45.1 1506.2 105.0 1611.2 
KATL 61.4 124.2 505.9 53.6 6.8 752.0 37.1 789.2 
KLGA 37.3 73.9 369.5 20.3 18.4 519.5 6.2 525.8 
KEWR 39.1 29.9 193.1 38.2 16.2 316.5 44.6 361.1 
KMIA 14.1 15.3 2.8 1.8 4.3 38.3 273.9 312.1 
KDCA 19.7 39.4 106.1 9.9 3.4 178.4 6.0 184.4 
KPHX 9.4 66.8 5.7 2.2 0.5 84.6 21.6 106.3 
KCLT 8.7 40.8 8.2 0.9 0.0 58.7 41.1 99.8 
KFLL 5.4 9.3 1.4 2.2 0.8 19.0 80.0 99.1 
KBWI 15.1 25.9 44.1 5.3 0.4 90.8 7.8 98.5 
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Airport Total Delay 
(h) 
Total 
Operations 
Mean Delay per 
Operation (s) 
KJFK 404.3 1768 823
KATL 137.7 3422 144
KDCA 131.9 1092 434
KEWR 100.2 1682 214
KLGA 96.2 1334 259
KBOS 84.8 1407 216
KORD 61.7 2928 75
KBWI 57.9 1032 202
KCLT 53.2 1938 98
KSFO 44.7 1537 104
Table 16 shows airport delays allocated by cause without the influence of sector constraints. The top choke point 
airport is still KJFK, followed by KDCA. The analysis shows that a capacity shortfall at KJFK is responsible for 754 hours 
of delay system-wide, although operations at KJFK experience only 404 hours of this delay, Table 15. The top 10 
constrained airports account for 1684 hours of the 2167 hours of total delay listed in Table 9; that is 78% of the total 
delay due to airports. 
Table 16. Allocation of Airport Delay by Cause for 2030 Scenario with 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and Unconstrained Airspace 
Capacities 
Airport ATC_AAR 
(h) 
ATC_ADR 
(h) 
TFM_AAR_
GATE (h) 
TFM_AAR_
MAN (h) 
TFM_AAR_
INT (h) 
Total 
Airport 
Source 
Delay (h) 
SECTOR_
CONGST_ 
GATE (h) 
Total 
Delay 
(h) 
KJFK 114.0 191.3 356.7 65.8 26.1 753.8 0.0 753.8
KDCA 26.6 56.5 207.8 16.2 6.0 313.1 0.0 313.1
KATL 34.6 62.0 43.3 15.5 0.2 155.6 0.0 155.6
KEWR 22.4 56.0 24.4 13.6 3.3 119.7 0.0 119.7
KLGA 23.4 43.5 28.1 6.5 1.9 103.5 0.0 103.5
KBWI 13.5 25.5 24.6 3.6 0.2 67.5 0.0 67.5
KSFO 13.5 23.6 10.0 6.8 0.2 54.1 0.0 54.1
KPHX 8.3 33.8 2.3 1.3 0.2 45.8 0.0 45.8
KCLT 7.9 27.8 2.5 0.5 0.0 38.8 0.0 38.8
KMSP 7.8 22.8 0.7 0.5 0.1 31.9 0.0 31.9
Figure 10 shows that at KJFK, demand exceeds capacity for a sustained period of several hours for the 2030 scenario. 
This is with an increase in VMC capacity to 107 operations per hour from the current capacity of approximately 94 
per hour. The resulting delays average close to 14 minutes with 44 flights delayed more than 1 hour. This is in perfect 
weather; the 2030 IMC estimated capacity is 94 operations per hour, so with the same demand delays would be 
significantly longer. The chart only shows delays taken at KJFK; that is 404 hours in total. KJFK is the cause of almost 
754 hours of total delay, Table 16, so the additional 350 hours caused by constraints at KJFK are taken at other 
airports or in-flight. 
An analysis by Neitzke and Guerreiro (reference 2) determined that the maximum theoretical capacity at KJFK is as 
high as 166 operations per hour. This is assuming no constraints other than the need to maintain single occupancy of 
the runways and safe separation using current standards. In reality, other constraints include using standard routes, 
avoiding traffic streams from proximate airports and restricted airspace, noise etc. Ignoring all constraints other than 
physical limits was intentional. The purpose of the reference 2 study was to determine how much capacity remains at 
KJFK beyond current day utilization. With advanced technologies and procedures, some reasonable proportion of the 
remaining theoretical capacity could be used in the future. Figure 10 shows that for the projected 2030 demand a 
capacity of around 140 to 145 operations per hour is sufficient to meet the demand and provide some spare capacity 
to maintain low delays. According to reference 2, this is theoretically feasible without adding runways or otherwise 
changing the runway layout at KJFK. Given the limited land available at or near KJFK, major changes may be infeasible 
or very costly. Beyond 2030 as demand exceeds the maximum achievable capacity, other options such as using larger 
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aircraft or rerouting passengers that are using KJFK as a transfer hub to alternative hubs may be necessary to ensure 
low delays. 
Figure 11 shows that at KDCA demand exceeds or is close to assumed VMC capacity of 67 operations per hour for a 
sustained period of several hours for the 2030 scenario. The resulting delays average slightly more than 7 minutes 
with four flights delayed more than 1 hour. This is in perfect weather; the 2030 IMC estimated capacity is 64 
operations per hour, so with the same demand delays would be significantly longer. In addition to the 132 hours of 
delay taken at KDCA, an additional 181 hours of delay caused by constraints at KDCA are taken at other airports or in-
flight. Regulations limit operations at KDCA to nominally 62 operations per hour. (Although, note that the baseline 
2012 data has 70 operations and the FACT3 based data for 2030 has 67 operations). Even if operations were 
unregulated, the runway layout at KDCA is not conducive to significantly increased operations; it has a short runway 
(4991 feet) that cannot be used by many commercial passenger aircraft and the other two runways (5204 feet and 
7169 feet) intersect so limiting utilization. In addition, KDCA currently has 44 gates; that is insufficient to 
accommodate significantly increased demand. 
The KDCA chart shows a sudden peak in delays, reaching 123 minutes at hour 19 of the simulation. This appears 
anomalous so requires explanation. Investigation shows that the peak is the result of delays to 3 flights departing 
from KDCA to KJFK. Congestion at KJFK cause the delay, not inadequate capacity at KDCA during this time period, see 
hour 19 of Figure 10. In addition, there are four arrival operations with almost no delay at KDCA during hour 19. The 
calculated average delay for the seven operations is 122.9 minutes confirming that the chart is correct. 
 
Figure 10. KJFK Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2030 Scenario 
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Figure 11. KDCA Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2030 Scenario 
Sectors Congestion 
Table 9 in the summary section, lists the system-wide sector delay for each of the scenarios. A total of 1739 hours of 
sector delay occurs for the 2030 scenario using current airports and sector capacities. This is substantially longer than 
the 33 hours result for the 2012 scenario. Using current day sector boundaries and capacities allows analysis to 
identify the need for improvements. Increasing airport capacities to the 2030 Advanced ATC values reduces sector 
delay by a small amount to 1608 hours.  
By 2030, major changes to airspace structure and operations are possible. A 20% increase in sector capacities 
reduces total delay to 266 hours. A 50% increase almost eliminates airspace congestion in the 930 sectors modeled in 
ACES. This assumes full sector availability, with no capacity reduction for weather. The values for reduced total delay 
are for a system-wide increase in capacity. Further analysis later in this section shows that only a small number of 
sectors require increases in good-weather capacity to meet projected 2030 demand. 
With Current Airport and Airspace Sector Capacities 
Table 17 shows that delays in the 10 sectors with most congestion are substantial compared to the 2012 scenario 
delays listed in Table 12. Miami sector ZMA62 causes the most delay, but as cautioned previously more sophisticated 
TFM than modeled in ACES could potentially alleviate congestion by rerouting traffic.  
Table 18 shows that increasing airport capacity alone has a small beneficial effect on airspace congestion. Total 
sector delay reduces to 1608 hours.  The top 10 sectors with most delay account for 1240 hours of the total. That is 
77% of the total sector delay, indicating that only a small number of the 930 sectors modeled in ACES require 
significant increases in capacity.  
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Table 17. Allocation of Sector Delay by Cause with Current Airports and Airspace Sector Capacities for 2030 Scenario 
Sector SECTOR_CONGST_GATE 
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_MAN
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_INT 
(h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
ZMA62 524.5 2.3 188.2 714.9 
ZBW02 142.2 0.9 3.1 146.2 
ZMP11 81.9 5.8 13.2 100.8 
ZLC41 74.6 7.6 1.4 83.7 
ZNY75 55.0 6.6 1.8 63.4 
ZBW20 52.4 1.5 3.4 57.3 
ZLA36 38.4 6.1 0.0 44.5 
ZLA39 33.5 6.7 0.0 40.1 
ZME43 34.0 5.5 0.0 39.5 
ZLC20 19.4 5.1 5.1 29.7 
 
Table 18. Allocation of Sector Delay by Cause with 2030 Advanced ATC Airports and Current Airspace Sector Capacities for 
2030 Scenario 
Sector SECTOR_CONGST_GATE 
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_MAN
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_INT 
(h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
ZMA62 506.6 3.0 188.1 697.6 
ZBW02 124.5 0.8 1.1 126.4 
ZMP11 76.3 5.4 12.5 94.2 
ZBW20 68.8 1.9 4.9 75.5 
ZLC41 65.6 7.2 1.3 74.1 
ZLA36 41.2 6.3 0.0 47.5 
ZLA39 32.7 7.3 0.0 40.0 
ZME43 34.6 4.5 0.0 39.1 
ZLC20 17.1 5.5 5.0 27.6 
ZAB67 17.2 2.7 0.1 20.0 
With 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and Increasing Airspace Sector Capacities  
Table 19 and Table 20 show the effect of increasing system-wide sector capacities by 20% and 50% respectively. 
Increasing capacities by 20% reduces delays significantly leaving only Miami sector ZMA62 as the apparent cause of 
significant delay. Increasing capacities by 50% virtually eliminates delays, only ZMA62 has a noticeable delay. 
Rerouting some flights at times of peak congestion may eliminate remaining congestion at ZMA62.  
Table 19. Allocation of Sector Delay by Cause with 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and +20% Airspace Sector Capacities for 2030 
Scenario 
Sector SECTOR_CONGST_GATE
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_MAN
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_INT 
(h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
ZMA62 124.9 1.6 58.0 184.5 
ZMP11 5.5 2.8 0.4 8.7 
ZBW02 7.6 0.1 0.1 7.8 
ZLA36 3.8 1.6 0.0 5.4 
ZBW20 4.5 0.4 0.4 5.4 
ZLC41 2.7 1.6 0.1 4.3 
ZMP20 2.6 1.1 0.0 3.7 
ZME43 2.6 1.1 0.0 3.7 
ZID76 2.3 0.3 0.2 2.8 
ZHU26 1.4 0.7 0.1 2.2 
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Table 20. Allocation of Sector Delay by Cause with 2030 Advanced ATC Airport and +50% Airspace Sector Capacities for 2030 
Scenario 
Sector SECTOR_CONGST_GATE
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_MAN
(h) 
SECTOR_CONGST_INT 
(h) 
Total 
Delay (h) 
ZMA62 6.9 0.7 2.1 9.7 
ZMP11 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.9 
ZMP20 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.6 
ZID76 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5 
ZNY55 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ZBW20 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 
ZHU37 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ZLA36 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 
ZID91 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 
ZDV07 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Effect of Passenger Choice on Congestion 
Passengers respond to increased flight segment times by seeking alternative modes or routes where feasible, as 
described in Influence of Increased Travel Times on Passenger Choice. The results discussed in this section are for the 
year 2030 scenario taking into account the influence of delays, with 2030 Advanced ATC Airports and Unconstrained 
Airspace Capacities.  
Figure 12 below shows that mean delay per flight reduces to 103 seconds, from 127 seconds; that is 19% compared 
to the same scenario without increased travel times shown by Figure 9. There is a significant reduction in the number 
of flights delayed for more than 1 hour, now 92 compared to 209. This is with just 131 fewer flights in ACES NAS 
wide. (Note that the total flight numbers flown in ACES do not exactly match the total in Table 6 due to ACES 
rejecting a small number of flights as explained previously). The reduction in delay may seem disproportionate to the 
small reduction in flights, but these flights are lost from the most congested routes as analyzed later in this section. In 
addition, some passengers choose less congested air routes; some flight segments have an increase in flights, while 
others show a loss, so the aggregate change does not show the complete effect. 
 
Figure 12. System-Wide Mean Hourly Delay for 2030 Scenario with Influence of Delays  
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Table 21 lists the 10 airports with most delay. The table shows the delay at the point taken, not allocated to the root 
cause. This table is directly comparable to Table 15. Most of the congested airports show reduced operations and 
delay with the largest reductions occurring at KJFK and KDCA.   
Table 21. Airport Delay for 2030 Scenario with Influence of Delays 
Airport Total Delay 
(h) 
Difference 
Table 15 
Total 
Operations 
Difference 
Table 15 
Mean Delay per 
Operation (s) 
Difference 
Table 15 
KJFK 314.2 90.1 1693 75 668 155
KATL 126.4 11.3 3395 27 134 10
KEWR 104.3 -4.1 1674 8 224 -10
KLGA 90.2 6 1341 -7 242 17
KDCA 85.3 46.6 1001 91 306 128
KBOS 54.7 30.1 1404 3 140 76
KBWI 54.3 3.6 1031 1 189 13
KCLT 48.1 5.1 1954 -16 88 10
KSFO 44.3 0.4 1530 7 104 0
KPHX 40.9 N/A 1597 N/A 92 N/A
Table 22 shows airport delays allocated by cause. This table is directly comparable to Table 16. KJFK and KDCA 
combined cause almost 500 hours less delay, 32% less, due to passengers avoiding these airports. Domestic 
passenger enplanements at KJFK are 13.2% less and at KDCA 10.5% less, as listed in Table 5. 
Table 22. Allocation of Airport Delay by Cause for 2030 Scenario with Influence of Delays 
Airport ATC AAR 
(h) 
ATC ADR 
(h) 
TFM AAR
GATE 
(h) 
TFM AAR
MAN 
(h) 
TFM AAR
INT 
(h) 
Total 
Airport 
Source 
Delay (h) 
SECTOR 
CONGS
T 
GATE 
(h) 
Total 
Delay 
(h) 
Total 
Delay 
Difference 
Table 16 
(h) 
KJFK 91.9 151.9 192.4 53.6 15.6 505.4 0.0 505.4 248.4
KATL 34.3 64.3 43.2 15.2 0.1 157.1 0.0 157.1 -1.5
KEWR 21.1 64.9 26.1 13.3 3.8 129.2 0.0 129.2 -9.5
KLGA 27.3 48.6 35.3 7.3 2.7 121.1 0.0 121.1 -17.6
KDCA 17.7 39.0 33.7 5.8 1.4 97.7 0.0 97.7 215.4
KBWI 14.5 27.6 30.0 4.4 0.3 76.9 0.0 76.9 -9.4
KSFO 13.2 23.4 11.8 6.6 0.3 55.3 0.0 55.3 -1.2
KCLT 9.1 30.9 3.8 0.8 0.0 44.6 0.0 44.6 -5.8
KPHX 7.9 31.5 1.1 0.8 0.1 41.4 0.0 41.4 4.4
KMSP 7.4 24.0 1.7 1.1 0.1 34.4 0.0 34.4 -2.5
Figure 13 shows a reduction of delay at KJFK of 90.1 hours, that is 22% compared to Figure 10. This is for a reduction 
of 75 KJFK operations, a 4% reduction. The chart only shows delays taken at KJFK; that is 314 hours in total. KJFK is 
the cause of 505 hours of total delay, Table 22, so the additional 191 hours caused by constraints at KJFK are taken at 
other airports or in-flight. 
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Figure 13. KJFK Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2030 Scenario with Influence of Delays 
Table 23 shows the flight segments to and from KJFK that show the most reduction in delays. The KBOS to KJFK flight 
segment shows a 45% reduction in total delay for a 15% reduction in the number of flights. This reduction in delay is 
only partly attributable to the 3-flight reduction on this route. Delays are shorter overall due to the reduction in total 
operations at KJFK.  
Table 23. KJFK Difference in Delays and Operations for 2030 Scenario Flight Segments with Influence of Delays 
Departure 
Airport 
Arrival 
Airport 
2030 Scenario 2030 Scenario with Influence 
of Delays 
Difference Between 
Scenarios 
Total Delay 
(h) 
Number of 
Departures 
Total Delay 
(h) 
Number of 
Departures 
Total Delay  
(h) 
Number 
of 
Departur
es 
KBOS KJFK 43.9 20 24.2 17 19.7 3 
KMVY KJFK 18.1 5 5.9 3 12.3 2 
KORD KJFK 28.8 16 17.4 15 11.4 1 
KRDU KJFK 21.0 11 10.8 10 10.3 1 
KIAD KJFK 19.9 11 9.8 9 10.1 2 
KACK KJFK 14.2 6 6.2 4 8.0 2 
KBWI KJFK 14.4 5 6.5 4 7.9 1 
KBTV KJFK 13.5 6 5.8 4 7.8 2 
KDCA KJFK 21.6 9 1.7 7 6.6 2 
KBDL KJFK 8.1 2 15.0 1 6.0 1 
KJFK KDCA 8.9 9 1.7 6 7.2 3 
KJFK EGLL 9.9 33 7.6 33 2.3 0 
KJFK LFPG 5.2 15 4.0 15 1.2 0 
KJFK KLAX 7.6 36 6.6 36 1.0 0 
KJFK KBOS 3.0 18 2.1 16 0.9 2 
KJFK SBGR 3.3 12 2.4 12 0.9 0 
KJFK LEMD 3.8 10 3.0 10 0.8 0 
KJFK KORD 3.3 14 2.5 13 0.8 1 
KJFK KCMH 1.5 5 0.8 4 0.8 1 
KJFK KPDX 1.8 6 1.1 5 0.7 1 
Figure 14 show a reduction in delay at KDCA of 46.6 hours, that is 35% compared to Figure 11. This is for a reduction 
of 91 KDCA operations, an 8% reduction. Also of note is the sudden peak in delays at hour 19 in Figure 11 is no longer 
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present. As explained previously this was due to 3 flights departing from KDCA to KJFK. Congestion at KJFK caused 
14.3 hours of the total ground hold delay at KDCA to these 3 flights. Fewer flights arriving at KJFK due to passengers 
avoiding KJFK reduces ground holds at KDCA. The chart only shows delays taken at KDCA; that is 85 hours in total. 
KDCA is the cause of 215 hours of total delay, Table 22, so the additional 130 hours caused by constraints at KDCA are 
taken at other airports or in-flight. 
 
Figure 14. KDCA Operations and Mean Hourly Delay per Operation for 2030 Scenario with Influence of Delays 
Table 24 shows the flight segments to and from KDCA that show the most reduction in delays. The KLGA to KDCA 
flight segment shows a 66% reduction in total delay for a one-flight reduction, that is 3%. This reduction in delay is 
only partly attributable to the one-flight reduction on this route. Delays are shorter overall due to the reduction in 
total operations at KDCA by 91 flights. 
 26 
 
Table 24. KDCA Difference in Delays and Operations for 2030 Scenario Flight Segments with Influence of Delays 
Departure 
Airport 
Arrival 
Airport 
2030 Scenario 2030 Scenario with Influence 
of Delays 
Difference Between 
Scenarios 
Total Delay 
(h) 
Number of 
Departures 
Total Delay 
(h) 
Number of 
Departures 
Total Delay  
(h) 
Number of 
Departures 
KLGA KDCA 23.0 34 7.7 33 15.3 1
KBOS KDCA 18.1 29 4.4 27 13.8 2
KORD KDCA 15.5 27 2.5 27 13.1 0
KATL KDCA 14.5 25 3.3 25 11.2 0
KJFK KDCA 8.9 9 1.7 6 7.2 3
KCLT KDCA 9.7 16 2.7 14 7.0 2
KDTW KDCA 8.7 13 2.1 12 6.7 1
KRDU KDCA 7.3 15 1.3 12 6.0 3
KMCO KDCA 7.3 14 1.9 13 5.5 1
KPHL KDCA 6.4 9 1.2 8 5.1 1
KDCA KJFK 21.6 9 15.0 7 6.6 2 
KDCA KATL 4.0 25 3.0 25 1.0 0 
KDCA KORD 3.6 28 2.8 28 0.8 0 
KDCA KBOS 2.8 28 2.0 27 0.7 1 
KDCA KBDL 1.1 11 0.4 9 0.6 2 
KDCA KCLT 1.6 15 1.0 14 0.6 1 
KDCA KRDU 1.5 14 0.9 12 0.6 2 
KDCA KCVG 1.0 12 0.4 10 0.6 2 
KDCA CYYZ 1.3 13 0.8 13 0.5 0 
KDCA KJAX 0.9 6 0.4 5 0.5 1 
 
A significant limitation of this analysis of congestion effects is that the methodology to create flight schedules by 
scaling a baseline does not allow removal of flights from that baseline. This means that on segments with a small 
number of passengers and correspondingly few daily flights, the flight schedule may be unchanged even though the 
number of passengers substantially reduces. Even for routes with many flights per day, the number of flights does 
not reduce below the baseline, even though the reduction in passengers may warrant this. 
In addition, TSAM does not use a mode-choice methodology for estimating growth in international flights or 
domestic legs of international flights, so the effects of congestion cannot be determined for these categories. 
Therefore, longer trip times apply only to internal domestic flights. For example, 44% of the flights at KJFK are 
international for the year 2030 scenario, an increase from 34% in 2012.   
Both of the above factors lead to an underestimation of the effects of delay on the schedule.  
Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to identify choke points in the current and future NAS. The results are for good weather, 
with all airports operating in VMC. The study required traffic demand and NAS capacities representative of the 
current system and projected future system. The results are from ACES for 24 hours of simulated traffic. 
An ACES traffic scenario representative of current demand requires a baseline day of recorded traffic. The day chosen 
for this study was 25 July 2012, since this day had mostly good weather NAS-wide with a high volume of traffic. The 
future date chosen for NAS analysis was the year 2030. The ACES future scenarios used TSAM projections to grow the 
baseline demand, with two alternative fuel price forecasts. An additional variation of the 2030 demand scenario, 
takes into account the influence of delays on passenger choice.  
FAA supplied data is used as the basis for estimates of current and future airport capacities and current sector 
definitions and capacities. Future sector capacities are simply scaled by 20% and 50% for this study. In addition, some 
simulation experiments used unconstrained airspace. 
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Current System Choke Points 
The current NAS baseline scenario has an average delay per flight of 53 seconds with total NAS wide delay of 656 
hours. Of this total, the majority of delay is due to congestion at a few airports, only 33 hours of delay is due to 
airspace congestion. There are no flights with delays of more than 1 hour.  
The airports responsible for most delay are KATL and KLGA. They are the root cause of 62 and 51 hours total of 
system-wide delay respectively. 
KATL has 59 hours of delay to operations at the airport, equating to 85 seconds mean delay per flight. An insignificant 
3 hours of delay caused by KATL occurs on the ground at other airports or in flight. KATL has some spare capacity, but 
peaks in either arrival or departure demand cause some overloading at some times of the day.  
KLGA has 49 hours of delay to operations at the airport, equating to 166 seconds mean delay per flight. KLGA is the 
root cause of 10 hours of additional delay, not taken at KLGA. KLGA is operating near capacity, but mostly still 
operates with low delays in good weather. 
Neither KATL nor KLGA is currently a significant choke point in VMC, as shown by the small amount of delay caused 
by these airports to other airports in the system.  
A conclusion from this study is that in perfect weather conditions, with current day available airport and sector 
capacities, there are no significant choke points, according to results from ACES simulation. A few airports are 
operating near capacity, and for those, significant delays will occur under IMC conditions. The 10 airports in order 
of most delay in VMC are KATL, KLGA, KPHX, KCLT, KJFK, KDCA, KORD, KEWR, KMSP and KLAX. 
Future System Projected Choke Points 
The conclusions regarding future choke points are subject to forecast uncertainty in demand and airline operations. 
Demand for airline travel may be significantly higher or lower than forecast if economic growth is significantly higher 
or lower than expected. Major air carriers are likely to make changes to their networks and hubs (some hubs could 
grow, others shrink).  New carriers may arise, others may merge or cease operations.  The effect is, some of these 
airports will be more congested than predicted, and others less so. 
The primary 2030 scenario uses the FAA’s fuel price forecast and future airport capacities. The 2030 airport capacities 
with “Advanced ATC” assumptions represents Operational Improvements that are part of FAA’s NextGen plans and 
concepts. There are additional improvements that NASA and other researchers are investigating that are not included. 
A simulation, using current airport and sector capacities with 2030 demand, shows very large delays as expected, 
since this scenario has 37% more total flights and 47% more scheduled airline flights than the current NAS baseline. 
Using current capacities is not a realistic expectation of the available capacity in 2030; rather it allows analysis of the 
causes of delay, identifying shortfalls in capacity. 
The results from ACES confirm that without capacity improvements, the NAS cannot support the 2030-projected 
demand. Results from simulation show an average delay per flight of 349 seconds with total NAS wide delay of 5,929 
hours. Over 1,000 flights experience delays of more than 1 hour. Of this total delay, the majority is due to airport 
congestion, but a substantial 1,739 hours is due to airspace congestion. KJFK is now the most overloaded airport with 
almost 33 minutes mean delay per flight. The 10 airports in order of most delay in VMC are KJFK, KATL, KLGA, KEWR, 
KMIA, KDCA, KPHX, KCLT, KFLL and KBWI. 
A scenario using unconstrained airspace, to isolate the effects of airport choke points and 2030 Advanced ATC airport 
capacities shows that delays still exceed the current day NAS delays. This scenario has an average delay per flight of 
127 seconds with total NAS wide delay of 2,167 hours. Total delay is more than three times longer than the current 
NAS baseline delay. The number of flights with more than 1-hour delay is 209; there were no flights of more than 1-
hour delay in the current day perfect weather baseline. This indicates that although the airport capacity 
improvements expected by 2030 significantly improve NAS performance, some capacity shortfall still exists, even in 
VMC. 
The main choke point airports are KJFK, KDCA, KATL, KEWR, KLGA; each causes more than 100 hours of system-wide 
delay in the 24 hours of simulated operations. KJFK is the most overloaded airport causing 745 hours of delay with 
KDCA second, causing 313 hours of system-wide delay. This is with unconstrained demand; in reality the number of 
future operations may be limited by regulation as is the case today or the airlines may restrict operations to avoid 
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excessive delays. The effect of insufficient capacity will be a balance between increased delay and unsatisfied 
demand. 
The sensitivity of the 2030 scenario delay to sector capacity is investigated by scaling the current NAS baseline 
capacities by 20% and then by 50%.  ACES results show a reduction in sector delays by a factor of more than six from 
1739 hours total, to 266 hours for a 20% increase in sector capacity and are reduced to a negligible 14 hours for a 
50% increase in capacity. 
Furthermore, the 10 sectors with most delay account for 86%, that is 223 hours of the 266 hours total delay for the 
20% increase case. Of those, the sector with most delay, Miami sector ZMA62 accounts for 184 hours. Increasing 
sector capacities by 50% reduces the ZMA62 delay to 9 hours. Rerouting some flights at times of peak congestion 
may eliminate remaining congestion at ZMA62. This result is for perfect weather. 
A conclusion from this study is that the 2030 Advanced ATC airport capacities are not sufficient to meet 2030 
demand even in VMC, although the improvements greatly reduce delays that would otherwise occur. KJFK, KDCA, 
KATL, KEWR, KLGA are the most significant choke points. The 10 airports in order of most delay in VMC are KJFK, 
KDCA, KATL, KEWR, KLGA, KBWI, KSFO, KPHX, KCLT and KMSP. A 20% to 50% increase in sector capacity at the 10 
most congested sectors, reduces sector congestion to negligible amounts in perfect weather, according to ACES 
results. 
A scenario using the EIA fuel price forecast shows a 12% reduction in total delay compared to using the FAA’s fuel 
price, for a 2% reduction in the total number of flights, with a corresponding 4% reduction in scheduled airline flights. 
This result is for simulation using 2030 Advanced ATC airport capacities and current NAS sector capacities. Delay due 
to airport constraints reduces by 16% and sector congestion by 6%. Using current sector capacities allows 
observation of the effects of a small reduction in flights on sector congestion. (Comparison with the 20% or greater 
increase in sector capacities case gives little insight since sector delays are very low).  
Passengers will avoid congested routes and airlines may charge more on high demand routes where there is little 
capacity to expand service, also encouraging some passengers to seek alternatives. A scenario taking into account the 
influence of delays on passenger choice shows a 20% reduction in delays for a 0.6% reduction in airline passenger 
flights. This result is for simulation using 2030 Advanced ATC airport capacities and unconstrained airspace capacities. 
The disproportionate reduction in delay indicates that delays are highly sensitive to passenger choice. The delay 
reduction has two causes; passengers switching to an alternative mode; and switching to less congested flight routes. 
The aggregate change in flights does not give full insight into the reasons for the reduction in delays. 
A conclusion from this study is that a small reduction in flights can have a disproportionate effect on reducing 
delays once resources start to become overloaded. In addition, changes to the routing or scheduling of flights to 
avoid congested resources or peak times can be very beneficial to the NAS.  
Since the results are quite sensitive to changes, some of these airports will be more congested than predicted and 
others less so. All major air carriers are likely to make further changes to their networks/hubs (some hubs could 
grow, others shrink) that are difficult to forecast.   
Notes: The original scope of this study included the effects of weather. The re-organization of NASA Aeronautics 
Programs for FY15 led to a reduction in scope to good-weather conditions to ensure the study completed in FY14. The 
airport capacity values used in this report are based on data provided by the FAA prior to publication of the FACT3 
report, reference 2. The final airport capacity values differ slightly from the pre-release data but are broadly similar. 
The “Advanced ATC” airport capacity values are not included in the published FACT3 report, since the report only 
contains projections for the year 2020. 
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